Business leaders should demand control rather than just the change of address, according to Rob Arnold, Chief Digital Officer, The Bunker (Part of the Cyberfort Group)
A business can move its data into a UK data centre and still leave the wrong people with the keys. If a former contractor’s account remains active or an administrator retains permissions nobody has reviewed, changing where the data lives does little to address those weaknesses.
For the board, the move may offer reassurance, but that should not be confused with better protection.
That is the danger when the rush towards sovereign cloud becomes an exercise in geography. Businesses want certainty about where their information lives. They should be equally demanding about who can reach it, what those identities can do and how quickly access can be stopped. That is the principle behind Zero Trust: access should be verified, not assumed simply because someone is inside a trusted network.
A Sovereign cloud does not make data secure because it sits on one side of a border. Security depends on the controls surrounding it.
A postcode is only part of the answer
There are legitimate reasons to care about location. Legal obligations, contractual commitments and operational requirements can all influence where information should be stored and processed. Sovereignty also raises questions about jurisdiction, provider control and continuity. Those concerns deserve scrutiny.
But residency and security answer different questions. Knowing where a database resides tells you little about whether a supplier has unnecessary access, whether an employee can download its contents or whether a compromised account can change its settings.
Consider a company moving sensitive customer records into a domestic cloud environment. If it carries across the same excessive permissions and neglected accounts, those weaknesses travel with it. The migration may address a location requirement while leaving the route to a breach intact. A migration is also an opportunity to review those permissions rather than simply carry them across.
A credible sovereignty strategy must therefore extend beyond the building. It needs to establish who controls the environment and how that control is exercised. Otherwise, businesses risk treating a hosting decision as proof that their security problems have been resolved.
Follow the permissions
Cloud security becomes more useful to business leaders when the conversation moves from infrastructure diagrams to everyday access.
Who can read the payroll file? Who can create another administrator? Can an external support engineer reach production data? What happens to access when somebody changes role?
These questions expose the difference between a documented policy and a working control. An employee may need access to one application without needing every dataset connected to it. A supplier may need temporary privileges to resolve a fault without retaining them indefinitely. The same thinking applies to networks; access to one system should not automatically open a route to others.
Strong authentication helps establish who is signing in. It does not, by itself, establish whether that person should have the permissions attached to the account. Businesses also need access reviews, prompt removal of redundant accounts and privileges that reflect current responsibilities.
The same scrutiny must extend to the software connecting cloud services. Application credentials, automated processes and integrations can provide routes to sensitive information. An audit focused entirely on employees will miss part of the picture. Reviews should examine identity permissions alongside keys, secrets, storage settings and logging.
Audit what actually happens
The starting point is to identify the information that matters most and trace the paths through which it can be accessed. That includes internal users, external providers and the services moving data between systems.
Then test whether those permissions are necessary. Temporary access should expire. Powerful administrative rights should be tightly controlled. Permissions should change when responsibilities change, rather than accumulating throughout someone’s career.
This is particularly important across hybrid environments, where separate cloud platforms can fragment visibility. Consistent identity management and monitoring make it easier to understand access and spot behaviour that warrants investigation. Where appropriate, network segmentation can also limit how far a compromised account or workload can reach.
Procurement needs to ask equally searching questions. Who can administer the service? Under what circumstances can support staff access customer information? Who manages the encryption keys? What evidence will the customer receive when privileged access is used?
Encryption deserves particular care. Its value depends partly on how the keys and permissions are managed. A business needs to understand which identities can cause information to be decrypted, alongside knowing that encryption is enabled.
Prove you can take access away
An access policy is incomplete until the business has tested its response to misuse.
If an account behaves suspiciously, can the team suspend it quickly, investigate what it reached and keep essential services operating? Can it contain a compromised integration without discovering that nobody understands which processes depend on it?
Planning for compromised access, monitoring critical systems and rehearsing containment turn security intentions into operational capability. This is Zero Trust in practice: limiting access and containing the impact when something goes wrong.
These are also better questions for boards to ask alongside a proposed cloud migration. The investment case should explain which risks will fall, which will remain and who owns the work required to close the gaps.
Sovereign cloud can be a valuable part of that answer. It cannot excuse uncertainty about who holds access today.
Before approving a new home for their data, business leaders should demand evidence that they control the keys. A change of address is easy to demonstrate. Effective control is what they need to prove.

